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L Introduction
"One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the... freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation."1  The First Amendment
guarantees the freedom to speak the words one chooses.2 This freedom is a
fundamental right deeply ingrained in the American conception of a free
society and is subject to strong legal safeguards.3 This fundamental right,
however, is not absolute and a state may punish its abuse.4 Because "[a]
free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand,"5 states
frequently impose subsequent punishments in the form of civil liabilities or
criminal sanctions for abuses of speech.6 This common law principle
reflects the First Amendment's heavy presumption against the validity of
prior restraintsT -any judicial order forbidding speech before it occurs.'
Permanent injunctions that actually forbid speech activities are "classic
examples" of prior restraints. 9 Consequently, courts may issue injunctions
in certain cases for extremely narrow, limited categories of speech. 10
1. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944).
2. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech. .... ").
3. See Sonali Das, Comment, Silencing Speech in the Workplace: Re-Examining the
Use of Specific Speech Injunctive Relieffor Title VII Hostile Environment Work Claims, 34
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 321, 321 (2000) (striking down assumptions that one can forbid certain
words without also running a significant risk of suppression of ideas) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
4. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) ("Liberty of speech and of the
press is ... not an absolute right, and the state may punish its abuse.").
5. See Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) (emphasis added).
6. See id. at 559 ("The presumption against prior restraints is heavier, and the degree
of protection [is] broader, than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal
penalties.").
7. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (stating that any
system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity).
8. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) ("The term prior
restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to
occur."' (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, 4-14 (1984)).
9. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550 ("Temporary restraining orders and permanent
injunctions-.. . court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples of
prior restraints.").
10. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (listing the limited categories of
speech that are not absolutely protected by the doctrine of prior restraints: speech relating to
national security in time of war, incitements to violence, and obscenity).
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Despite the heavy presumption against the validity of prior restraints,
two cases by the California Supreme Court, Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car
System, Inc." and Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen,' 2 held that an
injunction against specific speech is permissible after an adjudication
finding the speech to be unlawful. 13  In Aguilar, the court held that a
properly tailored injunction prohibiting the continued use of racial epithets
in the workplace did not constitute an invalid prior restraint if there had
been a judicial determination that the epithets would contribute to a hostile
or abusive work environment resulting in employment discrimination.
14
More recently, Balboa held that an injunction prohibiting defamatory
statements was not a prior restraint if there had been a judicial
determination that the speech was defamatory.' 5
This Note examines the validity of the Aguilar and Balboa injunctions
and the use of the injunction as a remedy for offensive speech targeted at
homosexuals. Part II briefly reviews the doctrine of prior restraints. It next
assesses the circumstances under which the government may regulate
speech. Part III examines the California Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Aguilar and Balboa cases and discusses the permissibility of the injunction
as a remedy in each case. Several factors distinguish Aguilar from Balboa
and substantiate the conclusion that the Balboa injunction is overly broad
and is an invalid prior restraint. 16  The Balboa injunction is especially
troubling due to the nature of defamation laws: The injunction may
stigmatize homosexuals and increase anti-homosexual views because
11. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 858 (Cal. 1999)
(plurality opinion) (holding that an injunction prohibiting a pattern of speech that had been
previously found unlawful was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech).
12. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. 2007) (holding
that "an injunction issued following a trial that determined that the defendant defamed the
plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the defendant from repeating the defamation, is not
a prior restraint and does not offend the First Amendment").
13. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 848 ("[A] remedial injunction prohibiting the continued
use of racial epithets in the workplace does not violate the right to freedom of speech if there
has been a judicial determination that the use of such epithets will contribute to the
continuation of a hostile or abusive work environment and therefore will constitute
employment discrimination."); Balboa, 156 P.3d at 342 (holding that "a properly limited
injunction prohibiting [the] defendant from repeating to third persons statements about the
[defendant] that were determined at trial to be defamatory would not violate [the]
defendant's right to free speech").
14. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 848 (validating such an injunction).
15. See Balboa, 156 P.3d at 342 (validating such an injunction).
16. See Balboa, 156 P.3d at 257 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("The injunction in this case
serves no significant public interest, such as eliminating invidious racial discrimination in
employment, preventing incitement of immediate violence, or protecting national security.").
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statements imputing homosexuality are defamatory per se in certain states. 17
Finally, Part IV advocates the position that an injunction should be a
permissible remedy for defamation only after a jury determination of
defamation finding actual harm and after exhaustion of the remedy of
damages.
1 8
II. The First Amendment and Speech Regulations
A. Doctrine of Prior Restraints
The term "prior restraint" is a judicial or an administrative order that
forbids certain communications before the communications occur. 19 The
doctrine of prior restraints originated in the common law of England.
20
Under the English system of censorship in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the government regulated all printing presses and printers by
requiring prior government or church approval before publication.21 These
licensing laws were eventually abolished and "freedom of the press from
licensing came to assume the status of a common law or natural right.
22
Accordingly, "[t]he elimination of prior restraints was a 'leading purpose'
in the adoption of the First Amendment.,
23
17. Cf Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d. 130, 139 (D. Mass. 2004) ("'Defamation
per se' should be reserved for statements linking an individual to the category of persons
'deserving of social approbation' like a 'thief, murderer, prostitute, etc.' To suggest that
homosexuals should be put into this classification is nothing short of outrageous.") (citations
omitted).
18. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 793 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The right to free speech should not lightly be
placed within the control of a single man or woman.").
19. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (listing the limited categories of
speech that are not absolutely protected by the doctrine of prior restraints).
20. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553 n.2 (1993) ("The doctrine of
prior restraint has its roots in the 16th- and 17th-century English system of censorship.
Under that system, all printing presses and printers were licensed by the government, and
nothing could lawfully be published without the prior approval of a government or church
censor." (citing THOMAS EMERSON, SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 504 (Random
House 1971)).
21. See id. (explaining government censorship in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries).
22. Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
648, 651 (1955).
23. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 n.5 (citing
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938)).
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In a famous passage, William Blackstone proclaimed:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press;
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must
. 24take the consequences of his own tementy.
Hence, prior restraints are the "most serious and the least tolerable
infringement[s] on First Amendment rights. 25
Injunctions actually forbidding future speech are classic examples of
prior restraints.26 Injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application than do general ordinances ' 27 and thus ought to
be subjected to greater safeguards.28 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia has
warned that injunctions are the "product of individual judges rather than of
legislatures-and often of judges who have been chagrined by prior
disobedience of their orders. The right to free speech should not lightly be
placed within the control of a single man or woman.
29
Violation of an injunction results in contempt of court proceedings.3 °
Punishment for these proceedings is within the discretion of the court and
may involve heavy fines and up to six months of incarceration without a
jury trial.31 The threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication can be
said to "chill" speech, whereas an injunction "freezes" it at least for the
24. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 567-68 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
*151-152).
25. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
26. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (noting that "court
orders that actually forbid speech activities are classic examples of prior restraints").
27. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994).
28. See id. at 793 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] restriction
upon speech imposed by injunction (whether nominally content based or nominally content
neutral) is at least as deserving of strict scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction.").
29. Id.
30. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975) ("Persons who make private
determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even
if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect.").
31. See Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966) (stating that the federal
right to jury trial applicable to criminal contempt if punishment involves imprisonment for
more than six months); Cunningham v. State, 349 So.2d 702, 704 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (noting that if the defendant is not afforded the right to a trial by jury, the maximum
sentence of imprisonment is one day less than six months).
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time.32 As Erwin Chemerinsky has succinctly stated, "violations of an
injunction, even as an unconstitutional injunction, are punishable by
contempt, while violations of unconstitutional laws never can be
punished. 33  Accordingly, this "most extraordinary remedy" may be
imposed only where the "evil that would result from the reportage is both
great and certain and cannot be militated by less intrusive measures.
'' 4
B. Regulation of Offensive Speech
The First Amendment right to free speech protects derogatory and
offensive speech, especially when speech concerns public figures or public
issues. 35 No matter how thoroughly offensive or reprehensible the speech,
"the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. 36 The purpose
of the First Amendment is to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' The
U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly stated:
No one will disagree that the fundamental, permanent and overriding
policy of police and courts should be to permit and encourage utmost
freedom of utterance. It is the legal right of any American citizen to
advocate peaceful adoption of fascism or communism, socialism or
capitalism. He may go far in expressing sentiments whether pro-semitic
or anti-semitic, pro-negro or anti-negro, pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic.
He is legally free to argue for some anti-American system of
government to supersede by constitutional methods the one we have. It
is our philosophy that the course of government should be controlled by
a consensus of the governed. This process of reaching intelligent
32. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("A prior restraint, by
contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes'
it at least for the time." (citing Alexander Bickel, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975))).
33. Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 157,
165 (2007). Erwin Chemerinsky served as counsel to Anne Lemen, the defendant in Balboa.
34. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994).
35. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system." (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))).
36. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
37. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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popular decisions requires free discussion. Hence we should tolerate no
law or custom of censorship or suppression.
38
Although offensive speech is generally protected, the government may
impose regulations based upon the character of the forum where the speech
is expressed. 39 The state's power to regulate speech is especially limited in
public forums, areas traditionally devoted to assembly and debate such as
streets and parks.4° A court may impose reasonable, content-neutral time,
place, or manner restrictions for speech expressed in a public forum.41
Content-neutral regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and must leave open other, alternative channels of
communication. 42  Content-based regulations-restrictions based on the
subject matter of the speech-must be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 43 In a non-public
forum, a state may impose reasonable restrictions unless the restriction is
viewpoint-based. 44
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that prior restraints may be
permitted for speech constituting a threat to national security, obscenity,
and incitements to violence.45 In the context of hate speech targeted at
minorities, a court may enjoin such speech inciting imminent acts of
violence.46 A court may prohibit speech "directed to inciting or producing
38. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 32 (1949).
39. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
("The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations
upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at
issue.").
40. See id. at 45 (stating that streets and parks "have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public.., for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions" and that the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity in these quintessential public forums (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939))).
41. See id. ("The State may ... enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral .... ").
42. See id. (stating that content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations of speech
must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication").
43. Id.
44. Cf id. at 49 (stating that if a restriction discourages one viewpoint while
advancing another, it should be subject to strict scrutiny regardless of whether the forum is
non-public).
45. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (explaining that prior restraints
have been allowed in the past to prevent utterances which might hinder a war effort, incite a
riot or another type of violence, or offend the public due to their obscenity).
46. See id. ("The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not protect a man from an
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imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
47
This test is a strict standard and difficult to meet; in nearly every case where
it has been applied, the speech has been protected.48 A court may also
enjoin "fighting words," personally abusive epithets likely to provoke a
violent reaction when directed at the ordinary citizen.49  The California
Supreme Court added two new exceptions under which speech may
potentially be enjoined: (1) racial epithets after a judicial determination
that such epithets amount to workplace discrimination 5 and (2) defamatory
speech after a judicial determination finding the speech to be defamatory.5
III. Injunctive Remedy in Two New Contexts
A. Enjoining Speech Under Workplace Discrimination: Aguilar v. Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc.
Workplace discrimination claims are on the rise. In 2007, the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received the highest volume
of workplace discrimination complaints filed in the past five years. 2 It
received 82,792 complaints from private sector workers in the United
States, resulting in a nine percent increase from the number of complaints
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.").
47. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
48. See Robert Firester & Kendall Jones, Catchin' the Heat of the Beat: First
Amendment Analysis of Music Claimed to Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2000) (noting that from 1937 to 1951, the Supreme Court used the "clear and
present danger test" only three times to restrict speech, and that the Court has never invoked
the Brandenburg formulation to restrict speech (citing Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm
and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1453, 1457 (1991))).
49. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("States are free to ban the simple
use, without a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called 'fighting
words,' those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are,
as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942))).
50. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1999) (plurality
opinion) (validating such an injunction).
51. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007)
(upholding an injunction restricting speech previously determined to be unlawful).
52. See Jacqueline McManus, Discrimination in the Workplace, MONTEREY COUNTY
HERALD, Mar. 21, 2008 ("It is the highest volume of complaints received by the commission
in five years, and the largest increase since the early 1990s.").
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in 2006. 53 The most frequent basis for the alleged discrimination involved
race, retaliation, and gender.14 Continuing the upward trend, for fiscal year
2008, all EEOC complaints were up by 15 percent over 2007.' 5
California and other states' statutes make it unlawful for an employer
16to discriminate against any individual with respect to their employment.
Under the Fair Employment Housing Act (FEHA), California has a duty to
"protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek,
obtain and hold employment without discrimination" on account of race,
color, national origin, sex, or sexual orientation.57 The express purpose of
the FEHA is to eliminate discriminatory workplace practices by providing
effective remedies.58 Accordingly, under the FEHA, courts are authorized
to redress past employment discrimination as well as prevent a recurrence
of such misconduct.59 In interpreting the FEHA, a court may consider other
employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,60 the federal counterpart to the FEHA.6' Consequently,
53. See id. ("In 2007, it received 82,792 complaints from private sector workers in the
United States, up from 75,768 in 2006, a 9 percent increase.").
54. See id. ("Race, retaliation and gender were the most frequently alleged bases of
discrimination....").
55. U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, CHARGE STATISTICS FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2009, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfln (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010) on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
56. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2005) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment).
57. See id. § 12920 ("[It is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and
opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or
abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual
orientation.").
58. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 850 (Cal. 1999) (plurality
opinion) ("The express purpose of the FEHA is to provide effective remedies which will
eliminate such discriminatory practices.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See id. at 852 (explaining that if the FEHA finds an employer engaged in an
unlawful practice, it may order the employer to cease and desist from the unlawful practice
and further order affirmative or prospective relief to prevent the recurrence of the unlawful
practice).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (making it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any individual with respect to terms of employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). Congress originally enacted Title VII to allow
employees to seek injunctive relief to remedy past and to prevent future workplace
discrimination. See id. § 2000e-5 (noting a court may grant any equitable relief it deems
appropriate to eliminate workplace discrimination). Congress later expanded the remedies
available under Title VII by authorizing courts to award damages in an effort to compensate
injury to workers. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991§ 21, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
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California courts have adopted the same standard in evaluating workplace
discrimination claims under the FEHA.62
In Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., the Califomia Supreme
Court held that an injunction prohibiting the continued use of racial epithets
directed at employees in the workplace did not violate the First Amendment
after a judicial adjudication finding use of such epithets would contribute to
employment discrimination in violation of state and federal statutes.63
Plaintiffs, Latino drivers of Avis Rent A Car, filed suit against their
employer, Avis, and ten individuals alleging employment discrimination in
violation of the FEHA and other causes of actions.64 They requested an
injunction against their manager, Lawrence, prohibiting verbal harassment
and an injunction against Avis prohibiting the allowance of such
harassment.65  The complaint alleged Lawrence "verbally harassed
[plaintiffs] constantly. He routinely called only the Latino drivers
'motherfuckers' and other derogatory names, and continually demeaned
them on the basis of their race, national origin and lack of English language
skills.
66
A jury verdict found the defendants' conduct had violated the FEHA
and awarded plaintiffs money damages.67 The trial court issued an
injunction prohibiting Lawrence from using "any derogatory racial or ethnic
epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino employees of Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc. and... any uninvited intentional touching of said
Hispanic/ Latino employees, as long as he is employed by Avis Rent A Car
61. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 851 (plurality opinion) ("Verbal harassment in the
workplace also may constitute employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the federal counterpart of the FEHA.") (citations omitted).
62. See id. (concluding that Title VII cases may be considered in interpreting the
FEHA (citing Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998))).
63. See id. at 848 (validating such an injunction).
64. See id. at 849 (stating that seventeen Latino employees of Avis Rent A Car
System, Inc. sued Avis and ten named individuals alleging employment discrimination in
violation of the FEHA, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, as well as negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
65. See id. at 849 (noting that the lower court issued an injunction prohibiting the
manager from using derogatory speech descriptive of Hispanic or Latino employees and
enjoining Avis from allowing the manager to continue using such language).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 848 (noting that the lower court awarded damages against Avis in the
amount of $15,000 each to Hernandez, Lazo, Ramirez, Reyes, and Serrano, and damages
against Avis and Lawrence jointly and severally in the amount of $ 25,000 each to Mojica,
Peraza, and Recinos).
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System, Inc. in California. ' '68 The California Court of Appeal directed the
trial court to redraft the injunction to limit its scope to the workplace.69 It
also ordered the lower court to include in the injunction a list of derogatory
racial or ethnic epithets that were actually used in the workplace by the
defendants. 70  Defendants appealed, arguing that the injunction was an
invalid prior restraint violating their right to free speech.71
The California Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, first established
that Lawrence's racial epithets created a hostile or abusive work
environment on the basis of race.72  The court next determined that the
government had a compelling interest in preventing acts of invidious
discrimination wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may
transmit.7 3 Looking to two U.S. Supreme Court cases, the court suggested
that unlawful conduct and the words that amount to this conduct are not
constitutionally protected.7 4  Certain types of speech can be "swept up
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than at
speech and thus are not constitutionally protected.7 5 These cases stand for
the assertion that the First Amendment permits imposition of civil liabilities
for speech that creates a hostile work environment.7 6
The California Supreme Court also established that the First
Amendment permits the issuance of an injunction to prohibit discriminatory
conduct.77 Just as it is clear that "the First Amendment does not protect an
individual's right to commit treason ... through the use of the spoken word,
68. Id. at 850.
69. Id.
70. See id. (ordering the lower court to provide "an exemplary list of prohibited
derogatory racial or ethnic epithets, specifying epithets such as those actually used in the
workplace by Lawrence" in the injunction).
71. Id. at 848.
72. Id. at 852.
73. See id. at 854 (stating that the state has a compelling interest in preventing spoken
words, in conjunction with conduct, from causing employment discrimination).
74. See id. (reasoning that the holdings in two Title VII cases-Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986)-
are inconsistent with any suggestion that racial epithets amounting to workplace
discrimination are constitutionally protected).
75. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)).
76. See id. at 855 (reasoning that Supreme Court precedent supports the imposition of
civil liability in such cases).
77. See id. at 856 (holding that "the injunction at issue is not an invalid prior restraint,
because the order was issued only after the jury determined that defendants had engaged in
employment discrimination, and the order simply precluded defendants from continuing
their unlawful activity").
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it is equally clear that the First Amendment does not protect an employer's
or employee's right to engage in employment discrimination through the
use of the spoken word."78 Thus, an injunction against the use of future
epithets was not an invalid prior restraint because "[u]nder well-established
law ... the order was issued only after the jury determined that defendants
had engaged in employment discrimination. 7 9 After analyzing several U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, the court determined that in each case, the court
recognized "that once a court has found that a specific pattern of speech is
unlawful, an injunctive order prohibiting the repetition, perpetuation, or
continuation of that practice is not a prohibited 'prior restraint' of speech.,
80
Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and upheld
the injunction.8'
Justice Werdegar's concurring opinion stated the plurality should have
addressed the issue of whether speech that creates a hostile work
environment is protected by the First Amendment.82 Concluding that the
speech was not protected, she agreed with the plurality's holding because of
the following factors: speech occurring in the workplace, an unwilling and
captive audience, a compelling state interest in eliminating racial
discrimination in private employment, and ample alternative speech venues
for the speaker.83
The dissenting opinions characterized the injunction as a prior restraint
violating both state and federal constitutions." Justice Mosk argued that
78. Id. at 856 n.6.
79. Id. at 856.
80. Id. at 858 (quoting Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1991)).
81. See id. at 863 (remanding the case with instructions to redraft the injunction so as
to limit its scope to the workplace and to provide an exemplary list of prohibited words).
82. See id. (Werdegar, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality opinion for failing to
ask "whether the First Amendment permits imposition of civil liability under FEHA for pure
speech that creates a racially hostile or abusive work environment").
83. See id. at 875 (finding that "the several factors coalescing in this case---speech
occurring in the workplace, an unwilling and captive audience, a compelling state interest in
eradicating racial discrimination, and ample alternative speech venues for the speaker-
support the conclusion that the injunction, if sufficiently narrowed on remand... , will pass
constitutional muster").
84. See id. at 878 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Both the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and ... the California Constitution restrict the use of content-based prior
restraints on speech. The order at issue here ... constitutes just such a prior restraint."); id.
at 882 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("[T]he particular content-based injunction at issue
here... is invalid under the free speech guarantees of both the federal and state
Constitutions... ."); id. at 894 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("I would draw the line in the same
place as the California Constitution and find the injunction at issue here to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.").
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the injunction prohibited protected speech; therefore, absent a real and
immediate threat of future harm, it constituted an invalid prior restraint. 5
Justice Kennard found the injunction to be content and viewpoint-based. 6
The injunction was invalid because it was unnecessary and not properly
tailored.87 Justice Brown emphasized that the remedy of damages was
sufficient to deter any racial discrimination.
8
1. Injunction Under Employment Discrimination as Content-Neutral
Restriction
Aguilar sought to strike the appropriate balance between two
constitutional rights: The right to be free from employment discrimination
and the right to freedom of speech. The principle thrust of the court's
reasoning was that an injunction was permissible because it prohibited
speech that amounted to unlawful conduct prohibited by the FEHA.89
Further, the concurring opinion emphasized that the holding was confined
to a private forum with a captive audience that involved a compelling state
interest.90 These factors decreased defendants' constitutional protection to
free speech so that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment. 91
Lastly, the injunction was issued after a judicial determination involving a
85. See id. at 880 (Mosk, J, dissenting) ("I would hold that the injunction fails to
overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior restraints on
speech.").
86. See id. at 884 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (explaining that the injunction restricts
speech based on content because it prohibits speech for its communicative impact, and
restricts speech based on viewpoint because it prohibits the utterance of words that convey
and embody a particular bias).
87. See id. at 882 (finding the injunction invalid "because the record fails to establish
that an injunction restricting future speech is necessary to prevent recurrence .... [and]
because it is not narrowly drawn9+").
88. See id. at 893-94 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("There is a middle ground: employees
can sue and recover damages.").
89. See id. at 856 (plurality opinion) ("Under well-established law.., the injunction at
issue is not an invalid prior restraint, because the order was issued only after the jury
determined that defendants had engaged in employment discrimination and the order simply
precluded defendantsfrom continuing their unlawful activity.") (emphasis added).
90. See id. at 875 (Werdegar, J., concurring) ("I find that the several factors coalescing
in this case--speech occurring in the workplace, an unwilling and captive audience, a
compelling state interest in eradicating racial discrimination... support the conclusion that
the injunction ... will pass constitutional muster.").
91. See id. at 877-78 (concluding that a properly narrowed injunction will not violate
the First Amendment).
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jury trial and an award of damages, which provided sufficient procedural
safeguards.
92
Because of various fact-specific factors, Aguilar's holding is
consistent with the First Amendment insofar as the injunction is viewed as a
content-neutral regulation prohibiting unlawful conduct. An injunction
under employment discrimination enjoins verbal harassment of any content
that is discriminatorily directed at members of a protected class.93 This
injunction prohibits speech not on the basis of its content, but on the basis
of unlawful harassment of a protected class.
This content-neutral approach allows an injunction to prohibit
discriminatory epithets expressed in the private workplace, a private setting
to which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the reasonable time, place,
and manner doctrine. 94  An injunction restricting epithets amounting to
workplace discrimination is akin to a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction because the defendants remain free to hurl the same epithets at
the plaintiffs anywhere and anytime outside the workplace. 95 Furthermore,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated the government may act as a censor for
some kinds of speech on the grounds of their offensive nature only when a
captive audience cannot avoid exposure.96 Accordingly, a properly tailored
injunction prohibiting epithets that have been judicially determined to
contribute to unlawful workplace discrimination is not an invalid prior
restraint.
92. See id. at 857-58 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that judicial findings that the
speech restricted is unlawful constitute sufficient procedural safeguards against invalid prior
restraints on speech (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973))).
93. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12920 (West 2005) (stating that discrimination on the
basis of one's membership in a protected class is illegal under FEHA); see also Charles R.
Calleros, Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.: The California Supreme Court Takes a
Divided Freeway to Content-Oriented Regulation of Workplace Speech, 34 U.S.F. L. REV.
237, 270 (2000) ("Title VII stands ready to apply in a neutral fashion to verbal harassment of
any content that is discriminatorily directed to members of a protected class.").
94. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 873 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme
Court has at least once applied the time, place and manner doctrine to conduct occurring on
private property).
95. See id. at 874 (reasoning that a restriction prohibiting racially hostile speech
limited in scope to the workplace leaves a person free to speak anywhere outside the
workplace).
96. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (stating that
selective restrictions on some kinds of speech have been upheld when the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure).
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B. Enjoining Speech Under Defamation: Balboa Island Village
Inn, Inc. v. Lemen
In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen,97 the California Supreme
Court added another category of speech under which speech can be
enjoined-defamatory speech.98  The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of whether an injunction is a permissible remedy for
defamation. 99 However, Balboa held that if a plaintiff prevails on a
defamation claim, then a court may issue an order forever prohibiting the
repetition of the defamatory statements. m00 To prevail on a defamation
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant published an
unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement with the requisite degree of
fault.'0 ' If the defendant is a public figure or the speech is a matter of
public concern, then the plaintiff must also prove actual malice, meaning
that the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of
falseness. 0 2
In Balboa, the California Supreme Court reasoned that once a court
has adjudicated speech to be defamatory, the speech is no longer protected
by the First Amendment. 0 3 Hence, an injunction does not constitute a prior
restraint and is a permissible remedy. 1°4 Lemen, a neighboring property
97. See Balboa Island Viii. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007)
(deciding that the injunction was overly broad but that a properly limited injunction would
not violate defendant's right to free speech).
98. See id. (stating that a "properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from
repeating to third persons statements about the Village Inn that were determined at trial to be
defamatory would not violate defendant's right to free speech").
99. Cf Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005) (finding it unnecessary to address
the merits of the case because the injunction had lost its underlying rationale upon the death
of the defamation victim).
100. See Balboa, 156 P.3d at 342 (determining that an injunction prohibiting speech
that was previously determined at trial to be defamatory would not violate the First
Amendment).
101. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 44-47 (West 1982) (defining defamation as
effected by libel or slander, and listing the elements).
102. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) ("The
constitutional guarantees require.., a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice."').
103. See Balboa, 156 P.3d at 353 (determining that an injunction prohibiting defendant
from repeating statements determined to be defamatory at trial does not violate the
defendant's right to free speech).
104. See id. at 342 (stating that an injunction prohibiting defamatory speech would not
violate defendant's right to free speech).
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owner of Balboa Island Village Inn, was perturbed by the noise and
inebriated behavior of patrons of the Inn. 10 5  After complaining to the
authorities, she began conducting various intrusive activities against the
Inn. 106
For over two years, Lemen videotaped and took various flash
photographs of the Inn's customers and employees, and called them
"drunks," "whores," and associated them with Satan. 10 7 While collecting
signatures for a petition against the Inn, she told neighbors that the Inn sold
drugs and alcohol to minors, that sex tapes were being filmed at the Inn,
and that the Inn was involved with the mafia and encouraged lesbian
activities. 108 Following these activities, the Inn's sales dropped more than
twenty percent. 109 Plaintiff Aric Toll, the owner and manager of the Inn,
filed a civil complaint against Lemen for defamation and other causes of
action."0 At a bench trial, twenty witnesses testified in person, or through
deposition transcripts or videotapes, against Lemen who denied most of the
activities and statements."' The court resolved the creditability issue in the
Inn's favor and issued a permanent injunction against Lemen.'12
The original injunction prohibited Lemen and persons acting on her
behalf or acting in concert with her from contacting individuals known to
be employees of the Inn." 13 It also prohibited Lemen from making certain
defamatory statements about the Inn.1 14 Lastly, it prohibited Lemen from
filming within twenty-five feet of the premises of the Inn, unless Lemen
was filming on her own property.1'5 The court of appeals upheld the last
part of the injunction precluding the defendant from filming within twenty-
five feet of the Inn, but invalidated the other parts upon finding that those
105. See id. at 341 (stating that Lemen complained of excessive noise and the behavior
of inebriated customers).
106. See id. (stating that Lemen videotaped the Inn approximately fifty times).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 342.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 357 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
112. Id at 357-58.
113. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007).
114. See id. (prohibiting Lemen from expressing that plaintiff: (1) sells alcohol to
minors, (2) stays open until 6:00 am, (3) makes sex videos, (4) is involved in child
pornography, (5) distributes illegal drugs, (6) has mafia connections, (7) encourages lesbian
activities, (8) participates in prostitution, and (9) serves tainted food).
115. Id.
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portions of the injunction violated Lemen's free speech rights under the
state and federal constitutions."
16
The Balboa court first addressed Lemen's argument that an injunction
prohibiting her from repeating statements already determined to be
defamatory is an impermissible prior restraint on speech." 7  The court
distinguished a restriction prohibiting the defendant's speech or publication
before it was spoken or published from a restriction prohibiting a defendant
from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that had been
determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful.'" The court held
that an injunctive remedy for the latter prohibition did not constitute a prior
restraint.' 9
The court next addressed Lemen's argument that damages are the sole
remedy for defamation because equity lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a
defamation. 20  It noted that if damages were the sole remedy, then a
defendant harmed by continuous defamation would have to bring a
succession of lawsuits if an award of damages was an insufficient
deterrence. 12 1 Hence, "a judgment for money damages will not always give
the plaintiff effective relief from a continuing pattern of defamation."
22
This assertion was illustrated by the fact that plaintiff sought only
injunctive relief and not money damages-the Inn just wanted Lemen to
116. Id.
117. See id. at 343 ("Defendant in the present case objects to the imposition of an
injunction prohibiting her from repeating statements the trial court determined were
slanderous, asserting the injunction constitutes an impermissible prior restraint.").
118. See id. at 344-45 ("Prohibiting a person from making a statement or publishing a
writing before that statement is spoken or the writing is published is far different from
prohibiting a defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that has been
determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful.").
119. See id. at 346 n.4 (reasoning that an injunction enjoining a defendant from
distributing defamatory statements already in print is no more objectionable than punishment
of defamation by punitive damage awards and criminal libel prosecutions).
120. See id. at 349 ("Lemen argues that damages are the sole remedy available for
defamation, stating: 'The traditional rule of Anglo-American law is that equity has no
jurisdiction to enjoin defamation."').
121. See id. at 351 ("Accepting Lemen's argument that the only remedy for defamation
is an action for damages would mean that a defendant.., would be required to bring a
succession of lawsuits if an award of damages was insufficient to deter the defendant from
continuing tortious behavior.").
122. Id.
16 WASH. & LEE J. C. R. SOC. JUSTICE 195 (2009)
stop her activities. 12  Thus, the court held that damages are not the sole
remedy for defamation.
124
Finally, the court addressed Lemen's argument that a change in
circumstances would render a statement that was once defamatory
permissible.'25 The court's response was that defendant could move the
court to modify or dissolve the injunction.1 26 Conversely, the Inn could
move to modify the injunction if Lemen repeated her defamatory statements
in a manner not expressly covered by the injunction. 27  The concurrence
further emphasized that California did not follow the collateral bar rule and,
thus, Lemen could use the affirmative defense of truth for violating an
injunction.
28
The Balboa court modified the injunction so that it prohibited Lemen
from stating the enumerated list of defamatory statements to third
persons--other than governmental enforcement officials-and from filming
within twenty-five feet of the Inn.129  After affirming the lower court's
ruling, the court held that a properly tailored injunction prohibiting speech
already adjudicated to be defamatory did not violate the defendant's First
Amendment rights under both state and federal constitutions.
30
Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion held that the injunction was an
unconstitutional prior restraint and that the appropriate remedy for
123. See id. ("The Village Inn did not seek money damages in its amended complaint.
The Inn did not want money from Lemen; it just wanted her to stop.").
124. Id. at 351 n.10 (holding that an award of damages is not the sole remedy available
for defamation).
125. See id. at 353 ("Lemen argues that she cannot be enjoined from repeating the same
statements found to be defamatory, because a change in circumstances might render
permissible a statement that was defamatory .... ").
126. See id. ("If such a change in circumstance occurs, defendant may move the court to
modify or dissolve the injunction.").
127. See id. ("By the same token, the Village Inn could move to modify the injunction
if Lemen repeated her defamatory statements in a manner not expressly covered by the
injunction.").
128. See id. (Baxter, J., concurring) (adding that in addition to moving the court to
modify or dissolve an injunction, a defendant may speak out and assert the truth of
statements as a defense in a prosecution for violation of an injunction).
129. See id. at 352 (concluding the injunction cannot prevent Lemen from presenting
her grievances to government officials because doing so would violate her constitutional
right to petition the government for redress).
130. See id. at 353 ("[Ihe injunction must be reversed in part because it is overly
broad, but a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating statements
about plaintiff that were determined at trial to be defamatory would not violate defendant's
right to free speech.").
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defamation is damages. 13' He argued that the majority's argument was
flawed because: (1) defamatory statements "cannot be determined by
viewing the statement in isolation from the context in which it is made,'
132
(2) a change in circumstances could render unprotected speech into truthful,
protected statements, 133 and (3) changes in wording could make it difficult
to determine whether a particular statement fell within an injunction's
prohibition. 134  Justice Kennard also found that the injunction was
unnecessary to protect any compelling state interest.135  Furthermore,
because plaintiff had only asked for injunctive relief, there was no
demonstration that monetary damages would have been an inadequate
remedy. 136 Accordingly, he argued the injunction was unconstitutional as
well as unnecessary.
137
Justice Werdegar's dissenting opinion distinguished the facts in
Aguilar with the facts in Balboa. 38 The following factors-an unwilling
and captive audience, a compelling state interest, alternative speech venues,
and two constitutional interests-supported her conclusion in Aguilar, but
these factors were missing in Balboa.139  "In the absence of any of the
unusual factors present in Aguilar... or any compelling United States
Supreme Court authority, it is inescapable that the injunction here is an
131. See id. at 354 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court of Appeal that an
injunction permanently prohibiting defendant's future speech is an unconstitutional restraint.
And... I would hold that the remedy for defamation is to award monetary damages.").
132. Id. at 356.
133. See id. (giving the example of an audience member falsely yelling "fire" in a
crowded theater versus an actor yelling the same word in the same crowded theater during a
performance to illustrate how context can affect First Amendment protection).
134. See id. (questioning whether or not Lemen's statement to a friend that the food at
the Village Inn is "bad" would imply that the food is "tainted" in violation of the injunction).
135. See id. at 357 ("The injunction here is not necessary to protect any compelling
state interest or any importance public policy.").
136. See id. at 358 ("Although plaintiff claimed it suffered a 20 percent loss in business
revenue after Lemen circulated her petition among the residents of Balboa
Island... plaintiff did not seek any monetary damages from Lemen. The only relief
plaintiff sought was a permanent injunction.").
137. See id. at 359 ("[T]he injunction is a prior restraint on future speech; it is
overbroad in prohibiting nondefamatory future speech; and it is unnecessary in the absence
of proof that compensatory damages would not be an adequate remedy.").
138. See id. at 360 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) ("Unlike in Aguilar, where we were called
on to balance countervailing constitutional concerns with the demands of the First
Amendment free speech guarantee, the present case involves a garden-variety defamation
under state law.") (emphasis added).
139. See id. at 361 (finding that none of the considerations that rendered Aguilar an
unusual case are present in Balboa).
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impermissible prior restraint on defendant's speech."'' 40  Further, the
plaintiff neglected to show that damages or punitive damages would have
failed to make the plaintiff whole or to deter future defamatory speech.'
41
C. Distinguishing Aguilar from Balboa
Balboa's holding created a new category of speech that falls outside
the protective purveyance of the prior restraint doctrine. 142 It essentially
allows a court to make law by using a one-size-fits-all rule to enjoin any
type of defamation after a judicial determination. Balboa relied on Aguilar
to support the contention that an injunction against defamation issued after
an adjudication does not amount to a prior restraint. 43 However, Aguilar is
distinguishable from Balboa in several ways that support the conclusion
that Balboa's holding was overly broad and its injunction constituted an
invalid prior restraint.
1. Required Showing of Actual Harm
First, victims of discriminatory epithets in hostile workplaces, unlike
victims of defamatory speech, may prevail on a workplace discrimination
claim only upon a sufficient showing that discriminatory conduct caused a
harmful work environment. 44  The standard for epithets amounting to
workplace discrimination under the FEHA is the same under Title VII
claims. 145  Both statutes require harassment to be sufficiently severe or
140. Id. at 364.
141. See id. ("Although plaintiff, a business operating a restaurant, claims it lost money
as a result of a defendant's defamatory comments, it has not shown why it cannot be made
whole by damages.").
142. See id. at 342 (majority opinion) (concluding that a properly limited injunction
prohibiting statements previously determined at trial to be defamatory does not constitute a
prior restraint).
143. See id. at 349 ("Accordingly, we hold that, following a trial at which it is
determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction
prohibiting the defendant from repeating the statements determined to be defamatory."
(citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 858 (Cal. 1999))).
144. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999)
("'Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."' (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21-22 (1993))).
145. See id. ("Verbal harassment in the workplace also may constitute employment
SPEECH REGULATION: INJUNCTION PROBLEMATIC
pervasive so as "to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment"' 46 and so as to create a "change in
the terms and conditions of employment.0 47  This standard requires a
showing of harmful conduct strong enough to actually change the
environment and conditions of employment.
148
This standard was met in Hope v. California Youth Authority.149 In
Hope, Hope, a gay man who had worked as a cook at a correctional facility,
brought a claim against his former employer for sexual orientation
harassment under FEHA. 150 The court emphasized that acts of harassment
may not be occasional or isolated, but instead, plaintiff must show a pattern
of harassment of a repeated or routine nature.' 5 ' Furthermore, acts of
harassment must fulfill both an objective standard based on a reasonable
person in the victim's position and a subjective standard based on how the
victim perceives the work environment.1
52
Hope testified that his immediate supervisor and coworker repeatedly
called him derogatory names such as "mother fuckin' faggot" and "homo"
during his five years of employment at the correctional facility. 53 The
security officer also instructed wards not to help Hope cook and clean while
discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... the federal counterpart of
the FEHA." (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986))).
146. Id. (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (1986)).
147. Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)).
148. See id. (finding that the plaintiff must prove that the conduct would have interfered
with a reasonable employee's work performance, seriously affected the psychological well-
being of a reasonable employee, that she was actually offended, and that the harassment was
repeated and of a routine nature) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App.
3d 590, 608-10 (Cal Ct. App. 1989)).
149. See Hope v. Cal. Youth Auth., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(affirming the judgment of the trial court finding for the plaintiff in his sexual orientation
harassment suit and awarding him economic and noneconomic damages).
150. Id. at 157.
151. See id. at 163 ("In determining what constitutes 'sufficiently pervasive'
harassment, the courts have held that acts of harassment cannot be occasional, isolated,
sporadic, or trivial, rather the plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a
repeated, routine or a generalized nature."' (quoting Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 610 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989))).
152. See id. ("The harassment must satisfy an objective and a subjective standard.
[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position, considering "all the circumstances. And, subjectively, an
employee must perceive the work environment to be hostile.") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
153. Id. at 165.
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other cooks continued to have the wards' assistance. 5 4  One of Hope's
supervisors even testified that the security officer treated Hope in a "cruel"
manner.155  When Hope complained to his manager, she responded,
"everyone thinks you're gay." 156 The court found that the facts alleged by
Hope had established that harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile work environment. 5 7 The Hope case is an example of
the high standard a plaintiff must meet to prevail on a harassment claim
under the FEHA. This high standard ensures that the plaintiff meets the
"heavy burden of justification"'l58 before obtaining a prior restraint on free
speech.
Defamation laws, on the other hand, allow a plaintiff to prevail
without having to show actual harm or special damages for statements that
are defamatory per se. Statements imputing homosexuality are defamatory
per se in certain states, including California.'59 Although the California
legislature has not pronounced homosexual conduct between two
consenting adults to be illegal, the court in Schomer v. Smidt held that a
false imputation that plaintiff engages in homosexual activities is
slanderous per se because the charge of lesbianism implies unchastity and
abnormal sexual behavior.16
0
In Mazart v. State,'6 1 the New York Court of Claims found it was
libelous per se for a university newspaper to publish a student-written letter
that falsely identified other students as members of the gay community.
62
The court emphasized that writing is defamatory per se if it exposes a
person to hatred, contempt, or unsavory opinion in the minds of a
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 166.
157. See id. at 164 ("The evidence supports the jury's implied finding that Hope was
harassed and that the harassment was sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions
of his employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive.").
158. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971).
159. See, e.g., Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("We
find that a false imputation of the commission of a homosexual act is slanderous per se.").
160. See id. ("[T]o state that one carries on sexual conduct be it alone, with members of
the opposite or similar sex imputes to them a 'want of chastity,' which in the eyes and minds
of their peers might and could subject them to disgrace, ridicule, damage to reputation,
lacking virtue or reliability.").
161. See Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that
university publication which published letter indicating that claimants were "members of the
gay community" constituted libel per se).
162. Id. at 604 (concluding that the claimants were libeled and that the libel was not
privileged).
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substantial part of the community. 16  Because a number of acquaintances
had questioned the students about their sexual orientation, the court
concluded that the letter had a negative impact on a number of people in the
university community.' 64 Thus, the mere questioning of the students'
sexual orientation was sufficient to establish that a substantial part of the
community had formed a negative opinion of these students.
t65
The above views, "in effect, validate ... [antihomosexual]
sentiment[s] and legitimize relegating homosexuals to second-class
status." 166 A judge could issue an injunction prohibiting all expressions
imputing homosexuality to an individual that can be proven false. 167 In a
state where the majority of the legislature presumes homosexuality to be
harmful to an individual's reputation, an injunction such as this could,
essentially, freeze all future expressions mentioning the homosexuality of
this individual.1 68  In this circumstance, the government would be
"effectively driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace"
based on the disfavored status of a minority group.
16 9
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that anyone seeking a prior
restraint on the right of free speech bears a heavy burden. 170 This heavy
burden requires showing that harmful speech will "surely result in direct,
163. See id. at 603 ("A writing is defamatory... if it tends to expose a person to hatred,
contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds of a
substantial number of the community, even though it may impute no moral turpitude to
him." (quoting Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100 (1947))).
164. See id. at 604 (noting that the fact that "[dleviant sexual intercourse and sodomy
were crimes in the State of New York at the time the letter was published" also colored the
community's opinion of the students).
165. See id. ("[T]he Court finds that a substantial number of the University community
would naturally assume that the claimants engaged in homosexual acts from such
identification.").
166. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d. 130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004).
167. Cf id. at 139 ("'Defamation per se' should be reserved for statements linking an
individual to the category of persons 'deserving of social approbation' like a 'thief,
murderer, prostitute, etc.' To suggest that homosexuals should be put into this classification
is nothing short of outrageous.") (citations omitted).
168. Cf id. at 137 ("[T]he large majority of the courts that have found an accusation of
homosexuality to be defamatory per se emphasized the fact that such a statement imputed
criminal conduct.").
169. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
170. See, e.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("Any prior
restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity.").
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immediate, and irreparable damage. ' '17' The mere adjudication of
defamation may not provide sufficient procedural safeguards because a
plaintiff can prevail on a defamation claim without having to show any
actual injury suffered or any danger of future harm.
2. Different Sources of Law
Second, the Aguilar and Balboa courts derived their authority to issue
injunctions from two different sources of law: a state statute (the FEHA)
and the common law (defamation laws). The FEHA empowers courts to
issue an injunction to prevent unlawful discriminatory conduct, and courts
frequently impose injunctions as an effective remedy to prevent the
recurrence of discriminatory practices in the workplace. 72  Defamation
laws, on the other hand, developed from the common law where the
traditional remedy is damages. 173 The principle derives from the maxim
that equity will not enjoin a defamation because damages are an adequate
remedy. 174  Damages seek to redress the reputational harm suffered by
making the plaintiff whole and act to deter future defamatory speech.175 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated, "an action for damages is the
only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose
reputation has been falsely dishonored."'176 Hence, the traditional remedy
for defamation is damages whereas a workplace discrimination claim
involves injunctive relief. 1
77
171. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971).
172. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 852 (Cal. 1999) (stating
that under the FEHA, "courts can, and often do, issue injunctions prohibiting the recurrence
or continuation of employment discrimination"). The California Legislature has directed the
FEHA "to be construed 'liberally' so as to accomplish its purposes." Id. at 850.
173. See, e.g., 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel & Slander § 433 (2008) ("Under the common-law
rule, damage is presumed from a defamation....").
174. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9:85 (2d ed. 1999) ("There is a
traditional maxim that 'equity will not enjoin a libel."').
175. See Estella Gold, Does Equity Still Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or
Slander?, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 259 (1982) (identifying three kinds of damages in
defamation cases: compensatory, emotional, and punitive (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 623 (1977))).
176. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
177. See 45C Am. JuR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2540 (2008) (listing workplace
discrimination laws, the violation of which entitles the victim to injunctive relief).
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3. Applicable Forums
Third, the Aguilar injunction against workplace discrimination was
confined to the workplace whereas the Balboa injunction could prohibit any
speech expressed in any type of forum. An injunction under Aguilar is
analogous to a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because the
injunction is limited only to the workplace, a private setting where various
restrictions on speech are permissible.
17 8
The holding in Balboa did not limit the injunction in time, place, or
manner. 179 Instead, the defendant is enjoined from uttering statements in
any place and in any manner. 180 The Balboa injunction prohibited Lemen's
speech, which was spurred by staunch religious beliefs, took place in a
public forum, was expressed in a peaceful manner, and concerned a matter
of widespread public interest.181 In fact, "Lemen's lawyers point out that
she made many of the disputed statements as part of her campaign against
the bar's expanded license, a matter of widespread public interest."'
182
Balboa's holding discounts the fact that even false and outrageous speech
expressed in a public forum deserves some protection because it can assist
political and social debates by challenging orthodoxies and enhancing
understandings.' 83  Furthermore, reliance on the temporal element of
falseness is troubling because a change in circumstances could change
unprotected, false statements into protected, true statements.184
178. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 980 P.2d 846, 873 n.7 (Cal. 1999)
(Werdegar, J., concurring) (stating that private employers often place various restrictions on
speech of employees, including requirements that salespersons speak well of employer's
products, restaurant wait staff not to speak negatively of food they are serving, and
employees keep trade secrets confidential).
179. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 361 (Cal. 2007)
(Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that "the injunction
prohibiting Lemen from repeating her defamatory statements is not, as in Aguilar, akin to a
time, place and manner restriction").
180. See id. at 356 (describing the majority's argument as a "syllogism: (1) Defamation
is not constitutionally protected speech; (2) it has been judicially determined that Lemen
defamed plaintiff... ; therefore (3) defendant may be enjoined from ever again making
those statements ... the argument has superficial appeal[, but I]ike many a syllogism, it is
flawed.") (citations omitted).
181. See id. at 341-42 (describing Lemen's critical statements against the Inn).
182. Maura Dolan, Free Speech Limits Tested Outside Inn, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007,
at 1.
183. See Clive Walker, Reforming the Crime of Libel, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 169,
202 (2005-2006) ("Even false and ludicrous speech can assist a society's political and social
debates by challenging orthodoxies and sharpening arguments and understandings.").
184. See id. (noting that "the designation of 'truth' assumes an... unconscionable
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4. Type of Restriction
Last, the injunctions in Aguilar and Balboa constitute different types
of restrictions requiring different levels of judicial scrutiny. As previously
discussed, the injunction in Aguilar prohibited harassment of any content
directed at a protected class.185  Hence, it is a content-neutral restriction
prohibiting speech on the basis of unlawful conduct rather than on the basis
of any viewpoint or opinion.' 86 Content-neutral restrictions are subject to
intermediate scrutiny where reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
are permitted. 187  Furthermore, a compelling state interest exists in
eradicating invidious discrimination in the workplace. 88 Thus, even under
the most exacting judicial scrutiny, a narrowly tailored injunction would not
be an invalid prior restraint if necessary to prevent future discrimination.
Defamatory speech expressed in a public forum is a type of speech that
is regulated because of its constitutionally proscribable content.' 89  An
injunction against defamation is content-based and thus must be necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.' 90 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a legitimate state interest
in compensating reputational attacks.' 9 1 But, it is has never stated an
injunction to enjoin defamatory speech constitutes a compelling state
interest. Balboa would allow a court to issue a content-based injunction
degree of... infallibility").
185. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 862-63 (Cal. 1999)
(plurality opinion) ("The trial court found that John Lawrence's use of racial epithets was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute employment discrimination. The trial court
further found that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent a continuation of the abusive
work environment.").
186. See id. at 863 ("Because Lawrence's past use of such epithets in the workplace had
been judicially determined to violate the FEHA, prohibiting him from continuing this
discriminatory activity does not constitute an invalid prior restraint of speech.").
187. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(explaining that such restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication).
188. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 874 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the
elimination of racial discrimination has often been a government interest "of the highest
order").
189. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (noting certain areas of
speech, including defamation, can be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content).
190. Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
191. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The legitimate state
interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted
on them by defamatory falsehood.").
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freezing specific speech without having to show it is necessary to further a
compelling state interest. The Balboa injunction was an invalid prior
restraint because the court failed to state a compelling state interest. 92 The
court also failed to establish the injunction was necessary; there was no
showing that the remedy of damages was inadequate to prevent further
harm. 193 Furthermore, racially defamatory speech may express a certain
viewpoint or bias.' 94 Allowing a court to bypass strict judicial scrutiny to
issue a content or viewpoint-based injunction is presumed to violate the
First Amendment. 195 Accordingly, any such injunction would be an invalid
prior restraint.
IV. When an Injunction Should Be a Permissible Remedy for Defamation
Balboa's bright-line rule for defamation is overinclusive. It allows
courts to enjoin speech that is defamatory per se without finding that the
speech has caused irreparable harm to the plaintiff. 96 It also permits courts
to restrict speech based on its proscribable content without finding that the
injunction is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. 97 This Note
argues that in order to strike the appropriate balance between an
individual's right to protect his reputation and an individual's right to free
speech, an injunctive remedy should be granted only as a last resort-after
a jury determination where plaintiff establishes actual harm and after
exhausting the remedy of damages.
192. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (requiring that restrictions based on the
subject matter of the speech in question must be "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
193. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 358 (Cal. 2007)
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for granting injunctive relief despite the
lack of a showing "that the defendant's wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injuries,
ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
194. See, e.g., R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 392 (cautioning against addressing "messages 'based
on virulent notions of racial supremacy' .... [by] silencing speech on the basis of its
content") (citations omitted).
195. See, e.g., id. at 382 ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
196. See Balboa, 156 P.3d at 358 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
bypassing the irreparable injury requirement in granting plaintiff injunctive relief).
197. See id. at 357 ("The injunction here is not necessary to protect any compelling
state interest or any important public policy.").
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Because "the injunction is a much more powerful weapon than a
statute ... [it] should be subjected to greater safeguards."'198 Accordingly, a
court should issue an injunction only after finding that the plaintiff suffered
actual harm from defamatory statements. A required showing of actual
harm would ensure the prohibition of an individual's speech is not based
solely on false statements of fact, which are "inevitable in free debate,
and.., must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need. . . to survive.'" 99
A defamation action should also include a jury trial to determine the
nature and extent of the harm.2° Juries are an integral factor in tort claims
because they check the government's power by diluting the power of the
judge.20' And noted previously, "[tihe right to free speech should not
lightly be placed within the control of a single man or woman. ' 20 2 Because
a jury is composed of more than one individual, it is more representative of
the values of the community.20 3  This aspect is especially important for
defamation claims because an element of defamation for the jury to decide
is whether the plaintiff suffered reputational harm so "as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."2°4 Hence, a jury's decision is, ideally, more reflective of
the community's estimation of whether speech actually lowered an
individual's reputation than that of a single judge.
An injunction for defamation should be permissible after exhausting
the traditional remedy of damages for defamation. Money damages may
include punitive damages if the plaintiff can show the defendant defamed
with actual malice.205 Because compensatory damages may not deter a
198. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 793 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1963) (quoting NAACP. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
200. This Note suggests that the unique nature of a defamation action compels a jury
trial to determine questions of fact. It does not address the issue of whether the
distinctiveness of a defamation claim should preclude any right to waive a jury trial, as
prescribed by state or federal statute.
201. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 27 (2003) ("[Jluries fit
into an overall scheme of a government of checks and balances.").
202. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. See Jonakait, supra note 201, at 67 ("[T]he community[] is more representative of
the diverse interests of the people than a judge.").
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
205. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (suggesting
that a public official plaintiff must prove that a statement was made with actual malice
before recovering damages).
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wealthy or persistent defendant, the plaintiff should pursue punitive
damages if there is a possibility of proving actual malice.20 6 Suing for
punitive damages ensures that money damages are exhausted and that the
defendant will be ineffective in the future if he continues to defame.20 7
Because a public figure must always show actual malice to prevail in a
defamation suit, a public figure must always pursue punitive damages first
before a court will consider an injunctive remedy.20 8 In some cases (for
example, if the defendant is insolvent), judgments against him will not deter
his defamatory behavior. However, regardless of the defendant's financial
situation, a plaintiff should obtain a judgment for money damages before
seeking an injunction. Otherwise, conditioning freedom of speech upon a
defendant's wealth would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's
guarantee.209
After exhausting the remedy of damages, if a defendant continues his
tortuous, defamatory behavior, it is sufficient to show that an award of
damages is ineffective relief and that an injunction is necessary to prevent
future, irreparable harm. General equity principles state: "[A injunction
issues only if there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or
imminently will violate, some provision of statutory or common law, and
that there is a 'cognizable danger of recurrent violation.' 210 Accordingly, a
plaintiff may move for an injunction to prevent recurring harm. At this
point, after damages were proven to be inadequate and the likelihood of
continuing harm is imminent, there is a compelling state interest to deter
211future, harmful defamation. A properly tailored injunction for
206. See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 364 (Cal. 2007)
(Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If, after paying damages,
defendant continues to utter defamatory statements and it is proved she did so intentionally
and maliciously, the law provides for punitive damages.").
207. See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (noting that "money damages will not always
give the plaintiff effective relief from a continuing pattern of defamation").
208. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 (declaring that a public official
plaintiff must prove that a statement was made with actual malice before recovering
damages).
209. See Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 1978) (stating that the
constitutional right to freely express one's opinion should not be conditioned upon the
economic status of the individual asserting that right).
210. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 766 n.3 (1994) (quoting United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
211. Cf CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) ("[W]e have imposed this
'most extraordinary remed[y]' only where the evil that would result from the reportage is
both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures." (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976))).
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defamation is necessary and is the only possible relief available to serve this
compelling state interest.
IV. Conclusion
Aguilar and Balboa both sought to enjoin speech despite the First
Amendment's heavy presumption against the validity of prior restraints.
Aguilar's injunction, a content-neutral restriction on speech expressed in a
private forum, was not an invalid prior restraint. However, Balboa's
injunction was overly broad because it did not require the plaintiff to show
evidence of harm suffered. Such an injunction could have negative effects
on the status and views of homosexuals. The injunction in Balboa is
essentially a content-based restriction, yet it allows a court to issue an
injunction and bypass strict judicial scrutiny under the guise of preventing
defamation. The heavy presumption against injunctions for defamation
ought to be overcome only when a jury finds the plaintiff suffered actual
harm from the defamatory statements and after the plaintiff has exhausted
the remedy of damages.
